Could Everything Be True? Probably Not by Plebani, M.
forthcoming in Philosophia The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/[ 10.1007/s11406-015-9584-8]

Could Everything Be True? Probably Not.
Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (2000) shows, finding a non question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest (1999, 2000, 2006).

1. Dialetheism and trivialism
Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true​[1]​. In a sense, such a position is the dual of skepticism: skeptics accept no claim, trivialists reject none. Virtually nobody is a trivialist, just as virtually nobody is a skeptic. This of course does not make trivialism or skepticism philosophically uninteresting. The interesting challenge, in both cases, is how to justify our rejection of such positions. Of course, the problem with trivialism is not to convince trivialists that they are wrong. This is too easy: they are already convinced (they believe everything). Nor is the problem to convince a classical or intuitionist logician that trivialism is false.  This is also too easy. Given that trivialism entails everything, it entails its own negation, which makes it a contradictory position: this is enough, for those who do not believe in true contradictions, to rule it out. The problem is to convince a neutral arbiter, somebody who takes trivialism seriously enough, without being himself a trivialist (see Priest 2000). 

It seems that such a neutral arbiter could be an average dialetheist: somebody who believes that some, but not all, contradictions are true. Rejecting trivialism on the ground that it is a contradictory doctrine, of course, is not a viable option for the dialetheist, who holds that some contradictory claims are true. Moreover, the trivial world, in some of the logics adopted by dialetheists, is an admissible model (see Priest 1979). This means that a dialetheist cannot show by logic alone that trivialism is false (see Berto 2008). One could conclude from this that if a dialetheist wants to argue against trivialism, he needs to use a-posteriori arguments. In fact, this is the strategy adopted by Priest (1999).

I would like to resist this conclusion. I won’t question the premise. I am going to concede that the trivial world, from the dialetheist point of view, is logically possible. But I would like to pursue the following line of thought: it is possible to argue that a certain hypothesis, even though logically possible, is as improbable as anything could be and should therefore be rejected. This has already been done. Peter van Inwagen has argued that “although the empty world is not impossible, it is as improbable as anything can be!”, as Sorensen (2012) puts it. In a similar vein, I would like to argue that given there is only one way in which everything can be true and infinitely many in which something can be untrue, we should expect the world to be non-trivial.

2. Van Inwagen’s statistical argument
Van Inwagen (1996: 99) proposes a statistical explanation of why there is something instead of nothing. Van Inwagen reasons that since there are infinitely many non-empty possible worlds and just one empty world, living an empty world is as improbable as anything could be, i.e. the probability of an empty universe is 0.​[2]​ 

He presents his argument as hinging upon the following premises:
(1) There are some beings;
(2) If there is more than one possible world, there are infinitely many;
(3) There is at most one possible world in which there are no beings;
(4) For any two possible worlds, the probability of their being actual is equal.  
(C ) The probability of the actual world being empty is 0.

Van Inwagen’s reasoning is the following. Given that there are beings, there is a non-empty possible world. Suppose this is the only possible world: this would mean that it is impossible that there be nothing. Suppose instead there is more than one possible world: by premise (2), there are infinitely many possible worlds; but in a logical space with infinitely many equiprobable – by premise (4) - possible worlds, the probability of each world is zero; given that there is at most one possible empty world by premise (3), the probability of there being nothing is 0.​[3]​

The detour through considering the possibility of there being just one possible world doesn’t seem to add much strength to the argument. It seems that it would have run equally well by replacing premise (1) with:

(1*) There is more than one possible world​[4]​. 

Premise (2) is defended by Van Inwagen on the ground that if there is more than one possible world, things can vary, and there seems to be infinitely many ways in which they can vary. Premise (3) is defended on the ground that in order for worlds w and w* to be different, there need to be a proposition true in just one of them: but if w and w* are both empty, they make true exactly the same propositions, so they must be identical. Premise (4) is clearly the most controversial one. Van Inwagen’s defense of 4 is based on conceiving possible worlds as (consistent) maximal states of a system of objects called “The Reality” (the mereological sum of all fundamental objects). States of a system of objects behave much like propositions: a system of objects is or is not in a given state, its states can be conjoined, disjoined, etc... Maximal states are such that being in such states either entails being in a state y or entails being in the complement of y, for any state y​[5]​.

Van Inwagen defends 4 by deriving it from this principle (1996: 104):

(M) for any system of objects (that has maximal states) the maximal states of the system should be regarded as equally probable, provided that the system is isolated.

Combining (M) with the thought that ‘The Reality’ is an isolated system yields (4): Reality’s 
maximal states, i.e. possible worlds, are equally probable. I don’t want to go into a detailed discussion of van Inwagen’s cases for premises (2)-(4). What I want to do, instead, is to use counterparts of these premises to build a symmetric argument for the conclusion that the probability of the actual world being trivial is 0. After doing so, I will try to see whether the counterparts of premises (2)-(4) should strike us as any less plausible than the original ones.

3. Van Inwagen*’s statistical argument

Suppose that van Inwagen’s argument works. It looks like we could develop an analogous argument for the conclusion that the probability of the world being trivial is the lowest possible. 

To do so, we begin by conceding a lot to the trivialist: we accept, for the sake of the argument, a picture of the logical space as including not only possible but impossible worlds as well (see Nolan (1997)). From here on, I will use ‘world’ to mean ‘possible or impossible world’. Given that there is just one world where everything is true and there are infinitely many worlds, the probability of a world in which everything is true is 0. “Although a trivial world being impossible is not a problem, it is as improbable as anything can be!”: shouldn’t this persuade an impartial arbiter (for instance a dialetheist) that we probably do not live in a trivial world?
The argument I am considering relies on these premises:
(1**)There is more than one world; 
(2*) If there is more than one world, there are infinitely
many;
(3*)There is at most one world in which everything is true;
(4*) For any two worlds, the probability of their being
actual is equal.
therefore:
(C* ) The probability of the actual world being trivial is 0.

It seems to me that the plausibility of none of van Inwagen’s premises is weakened by moving to a richer logical space, encompassing impossible along with possible worlds. Given that all possible worlds are worlds, (1**) is weaker than (1). The argument that supports (2) seems to support (2*) equally well. (3*) should be accepted in any context in which worlds are individuated by the propositions they make true. This would be the case in a generalized version of van Inwagen’s account, in which inconsistent maximal states of Reality are considered along with consistent ones (as that presented in Vander Laan 1997). The same holds if we consider possible worlds as sets of propositions, given that there is only one universal set.​[6]​ (3*) is arguably even more plausible than (3) in a context in which impossible worlds are taken into account. Setting aside the possibility of distinguishing possible empty worlds in terms of differences in the natural laws that hold in them (see Carroll 1994), we can certainly distinguish between possible empty worlds that respect logical and mathematical laws and impossible ones that don’t. 

Turning to (4*), considering inconsistent maximal states of Reality (sets of propositions, etc..) along with consistent ones in no way seems to make (M) less plausible: ‘Reality’ is just the same mereological object considered by van Inwagen.

4. Why is there anything untrue at all?

There is, of course, one important difference between my argument and that of van Inwagen. Van Inwagen simply assumes that the world is non empty. His statistical argument is offered to explain why the world is not empty, not to argue for the conclusion that the world is not empty. The statistical argument only proves that living in an empty world is extremely improbable. That an event is improbable might explain why it did not obtain, but it does not guarantee that it did not obtain. Extremely improbable events happen: in a fair lottery, one ticket wins despite its extremely low probability of being the winning ticket. Similarly, despite all the possible worlds having 0 probability of being the actual one, we live in one of them. This is not a major problem, though: I did not promise a conclusive argument against trivialism. Conclusion C* of Van Inwagen*’s argument is that the probability of the world being trivial is the lowest possible. Ceteris paribus, this should be enough to persuade a neutral arbiter that it is rational to expect the world to be non-trivial. Though we didn’t rule out trivialism, we still have provided an inductive argument against it.

A related problem is this. Van Inwagen argues that if there is just one possible world, then, given that the actual world is not empty, an empty world is simply impossible (and therefore its probability of being actual is 0 in this case as well). Of course, I cannot make any move analogous to this without begging the question against the trivialist. I cannot assume that there are untrue claims. Still, prima facie premise (1*) (i.e. that there is more than one possible world) enjoys great plausibility and I don’t see why, in trying to evaluate trivialism, a neutral arbiter shouldn’t concede (1**). Spinozism (the thesis that what is true is necessarily true) seems to be orthogonal to trivialism: one can argue that my being 1.80 m tall is only contingently true without begging the question against the trivialist. The neutral arbiter, therefore, should not flag arguments against Spinozism as illegitimate​[7]​. 

Moreover, note that Van Inwagen*’s argument would be of some use also in a context in which we had a-posteriori guarantees that our world is not a trivial one, but still wondered why we happen to live in such a world. Just as, even though knowing a posteriori that there is something instead of nothing, we still wonder why there is anything at all. 

5. Conclusions
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^1	  Recent discussions of trivialism include: Priest (1999, 2000,  2006), Bueno (2007), Kabay (2006, 2010) and Humberstone (2007).
^2	  I am following Van Inwagen in taking the lowest possible degree of probability to be zero. Alternatively one could say that the probability of living in an empty world is infinitesimal. Nothing important hinges upon that. See Van Inwagen (1996, fn. 5).
^3	  Of course, just as there is only one empty world, there is only one actual world: “For the sake of balanced reporting, van Inwagen should acknowledge that, by his reasoning, the actual world is also as improbable as anything can be. What really counts here is the probability of ‘There is something’ as opposed to ‘There is nothing’.” (Sorensen 2012). 
^4	  I will return on this point at the end of the paper.
^5	  This is a version of Plantingian realism. Other versions take possible worlds to be maximal consistent sets of propositions (sentences, etc.). 
^6	  Even if we consider worlds as pairs of sets, the set of the true and that of the false proposition, still there is just one trivial world: the one individuated by the pair {V, V}. 
^7	  This is true even if Kabay (2010) makes his case for trivialism arguing that everything is necessary true. My point is just that in the dialectical context  we are considering the trivialist is not entitled to presuppose Spinozism: there is no reason why the neutral arbiter should think that arguing against Spinozism we are in any way begging the question against the trivialist. 
